A particularly interesting consequence of panexperientialism would pertain to pairs of objects that are related in such a manner as to have certain correlated attributes but that have both dissolved into the wholeness (i.e. temporarily ceased to appear as objects within any instantiation of consciousness). When either one of those objects precipitates in some instantiation of consciousness or other (i.e. when, from a human perspective, a “measurement” has been made upon it), reducing its observed attributes from the range of possible attributes to a collection of actual attributes, the correlated attributes for the other (as yet unexperienced or unmeasured) object would immediately be reduced in accordance with those of the measured object. (This would be consistent with the nonlocal aspects of the quantum theory. See appendix 1.)
Within our conceptual model of the objective world, the spatial relationships between objects engender the idea of "space" as a reified theatre within which objects have their existence, and (consistent with materialism) within which such objects exist whether or not they are experienced. But the objective world itself consists of a category of the constituents of consciousness, and in panexperientialism there is nothing other than instantiations of consciousness. The conception of "space" consistent with materialism, then, has no role to play in panexperientialism, even though spatial relations still obtain between objects appearing within any particular instantiation of consciousness.